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Abstract  
 
This thesis explores the status of abortion in Australia and analyses the 
representations of women that are produced and relied upon in public discourse on 
this issue. Drawing predominantly on the field of corporeal feminist theory I examine 
the historical and political-legal context of abortion in Australia over time, and in 
particular debates concerning the medical abortion drug RU486. I argue that the 
debate has been informed by dualistic understandings of women as irrational, 
maternal vessels requiring paternalistic regulation in the interests of the reproduction 
of the nation. This thesis questions the assumption that oppostion to abortion is 
primarily motivated by concern for the foetus, and explores and elaborates the 
gendered and politico-cultural constructions of sexuality, the nation and women's 
'natural' role that inform the debate. Finally, I demonstrate that constructs of morality, 
rationality, sexuality and the nation have: been informed and limited by dualistic 
imaginaries of women and in response I argue for the feminist potential of an 
alternative embodied ethical framework 
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Chapter One: Of mothers and murderers   
 
We don’t want to live in an Australia where abortion again becomes the political 
plaything of men who think they know better. 
- Prime Minister Julia Gillard, 20131 
 
This bold statement made by then Prime Minister Julia Gillard drew criticism from all 
sides of politics; she was accused of "stoking a gender war" and not focusing on "the 
big policy issues."2 These criticisms are belied by the vulnerable and contested status 
of abortion access in Australia. The violent repudiation of Gillard’s warning suggests 
a deeper discomfort with the discussion of the issue of abortion in Australia, and in 
particular a sense that Gillard, as a (childless, unmarried) woman, cannot or should 
not speak on the issue.  
 
The question of abortion is the subject of my thesis, in particular I will consider the 
assumptions and representations of women that are relied upon in public discourse in 
relation to abortion. I will draw upon the theories of corporeal feminists including 
Elizabeth Grosz, Susan Bordo, Rosalyn Diprose and Moira Gatens in order to analyse 
the ways in which women have been represented in the debates concerning the 
passage through Australian Federal Parliament of the Bill to remove ministerial 
responsibility for approval of the medical abortion drug RU486. The discussions in 
Parliament, the Senate and the media at this time were dominated by the positioning 
of RU486 as a moral crisis for the nation, with women framed as irresponsible and 
dangerous, requiring regulation and control in the interests of the foetus. Corporeal 
feminism allows for a reconfiguring of the debate by bringing to light the operation of 
Cartesian dualism in positioning men as rational and cultured and women as irrational 
and closely associated with unruly nature, unable to transcend their bodies and so 
dominated by ungovernable emotion. Firstly, I will analyse the discussions 
                                                
1 Julia Gillard. The Blue Tie Speech: Prime Minister's Address to Women for Gillard, 
2013. australianpolitics.com.  
2 "Opposition accuses Julia Gillard of stoking 'gender war' with abortion comments." 
ABC News. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-06-12/gillard-under-fire-from-
opposition-over-abortion-claim/4747738. 
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surrounding RU486 with attention to how these dualistic notions operate through 
State and public discourse in relation to women’s reproductive choices. Secondly, I 
will explore the feminist potential of an alternative ethical3 framework that accounts 
for women’s embodied experience. 
 
The medical abortion drug RU486, or Mifepristone, had a delayed and contentious 
arrival in Australia. The passage of RU486 into Australia was marked by intense 
political and public debate over who had the authority to decide whether women 
should have access to medical abortion. The Therapeutic Goods Amendment (Repeal 
of Ministerial responsibility for approval of RU486) Bill 2005 was passed in 2006. It 
proposed that the decision to allow RU486 to be prescribed in Australia be made by 
the Therapeutic Goods Association rather than allowing the then Federal Health 
Minister Tony Abbott to continue to hold veto rights over the introduction of the drug. 
The RU486 debate became focused on the question of the morality of abortion, and 
who should be in the position to decide whether women should have the option of 
medical abortion. The rhetoric used was often not focused around women’s 
experience but rather it positioned the debate as a question of women’s rights versus 
foetal rights. The impact of this framing is a denial of women’s bodily integrity and 
an increased focus on whether individual abortions were morally justifiable, with 
reasons related to career, finance or simply not wanting a child being considered less 
justifiable than if the pregnancy resulted from rape. The debates in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate as well as the media coverage over the passage of the 
Bill provide an interesting case study of the discourse surrounding abortion in 
Australia and the ways in which women’s reproductive choices and bodies are 
positioned.  
 
In her 1989 work The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political 
Theory, Carole Pateman argues that women are excluded from civil society because 
the social contract that constitutes the basis of our representative democracy is a 
                                                
3 Corporeal feminists prefer to focus upon and employ the terminology of ethics 
rather than morals, as they argue that moral frameworks are informed by patriarchal 
ideology.   
 3	  
	  
“fraternal pact that constitutes civil society as a patriarchal or masculine order.”4 
While at first glance Pateman’s work may appear to have only historical relevance as 
a feminist critique of liberalism, this conception of the operation of patriarchy in 
modern civil society is vitally relevant for understanding the present day regulation of 
women’s reproduction. Pateman believes that the social contract is based on 
masculine bodies, presented as the universal, disembodied individual,5 and on the 
division between public and private spheres that mirrors the division between “men’s 
reason and women’s bodies.”6 For Pateman, women’s ability to give birth is central to 
modern patriarchy as the social contract is fundamentally: “an agreement through 
which the brothers inherit their legacy of patriarchal sex right and legitimise their 
claim over women’s bodies and ability to give birth.”7 This account of how dualistic 
and reductive gendered understandings of women as irrational and closer to nature 
and therefore in need of masculine control informs the culture and structures of 
contemporary society is reflected in later writings of corporeal feminists who seek to 
account for the ways in which women’s embodied experience has been marginalized 
within our social, legal and political spheres.  
 
In Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism, Elizabeth Grosz traces the ways 
in which women’s bodies have been imagined in philosophy, feminism and 
psychoanalysis and asks the question “What, ideally, would a feminist philosophy of 
the body avoid, and what must it take into consideration?”8 Grosz engages a broad 
range of theorists in order to form a theory of corporeal feminism that foregrounds the 
body, arguing that many feminists have only addressed the body as being either an 
“impediment to equality” or containing some “special insight”9 that male bodies do 
not possess. She finds both of these approaches to be damaging as they either accept 
or do not address the Cartesian dualism that frames mind and body as separate. 
Women have been and continue to be associated with nature and irrationality; their 
                                                
4 Carol Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political 
Theory (United Kingdom: Polity Press, 1989), 33. 
5 Ibid., 46. 
6 Ibid., 45. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism (Indiana, Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 21.  
9 Ibid., 4. 
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oppression has been historically justified by claims of ‘natural inequality’ attributed to 
their “being weaker, more prone to (hormonal) irregularities, intrusions, and 
unpredictabilities.”10 Grosz is conscious of the difficulty of addressing bodily 
difference without entering into essentialist and ahistorical assumptions that have 
defined the position of the body and instead combines philosophy and post-modern 
feminism as a means of challenging and expanding these prevailing notions for 
contemporary purposes.11  
 
Corporeal feminism is informed by Foucault’s understanding of bodies as the primary 
locus for the operations of power. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault develops an 
understanding of power that is attentive to the disciplinary techniques that define “a 
certain mode of political investment in the body”12 and disciplinary punishment that 
“is not so much the vengeance of an outraged law as its repetition, its repudiated 
insistence.”13 A Foucauldian concept of power is able to account for the ways in 
which embodied experience may be counter to formal assurances of equality, as “The 
real, corporeal disciplines constituted the foundation of the formal, juridical 
liberties.”14 Whilst Gatens is critical of Foucault’s failure to address the “patriarchal 
character of modern political life,” she believes his theorisation of power is useful to 
feminism because of his rejection of the idea that bodies have fixed characters as well 
as the need to understand the complex ways in which “socio-political structures 
construct particular kinds of bodies, with particular powers/capacities, needs and 
desires.”15 The concept that this work on the population is not limited to the direct 
control of government but carried out through a diverse array of institutions, 
surveillance, laws and discourse with a reliance on the creation of self-regulating 
subjects, is useful for feminism to account for the embodied articulation of power.   
 
                                                
10 Ibid.,14. 
11 Ibid., xiv. 
12 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1979), 140.  
13 Ibid., 180. 
14 Ibid., 222. 
15 Moira Gatens, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on difference and equality 
(Cambridge Polity Press, 1991), 138.  
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An attention to the embedded operation of power allows Susan Bordo, in The Body 
and the Reproduction of Femininity: A Feminist Appropriation of Foucault, to expand 
on previous feminist understandings of the regulation of bodies. Bordo suggests that 
previous theoretical models of the “oppressors and oppressed” used to explain the 
patriarchy do not account for “the mechanisms by which the subject becomes 
enmeshed, at times, into collusion with forces that sustain her own oppression.”16 In a 
manner similar to Grosz, Bordo takes Foucauldian theory and applies his concept of 
power to a feminist analysis of how women may be compelled to regulate their 
behaviour and bodies in more complex ways than the ‘oppressor and oppressed’ 
model allows for. Crucially, power is described by Foucault as “the network of 
practices, institutions and technologies that sustain positions of dominance and 
subordination within a particular domain” and power described is “not repressive, but 
constitutive.”17  This Foucauldian understanding of power is useful in the context of 
women’s experience of abortion; while there are elements of the ‘oppressor and 
oppressed model,’ for example majority male legislators making decisions to restrict 
abortion access, the complex interaction of social and institutional power on women’s 
subjectivity and their decisions is far more intricate than simply the matter of legality 
and access. Bordo’s approach allows for an analysis of how social and institutional 
influences create a self-regulating subject, and in the context of the RU486 debate it 
provides critical insight in the complex network in which ‘choices’ around abortion 
operate. Additionally, it can be used to analyse the frequent focus from those opposed 
to RU486 on rates of depression and posttraumatic stress disorder following an 
abortion.  
 
Rosalyn Diprose, in her 1994 The Bodies of Women: Ethics, Embodiment and Sexual 
Difference, echoes Grosz’s concern that feminism has tended to accept and work with 
prevailing dualistic frameworks that privilege a default masculine body. Diprose 
believes that situating ethics in a dualistic dichotomy that associates rationality with 
the mind and irrationality with nature and the body serves to “disqualify women from 
                                                
16 Susan Bordo, "The Body and the Reproduction of Feminity: A Feminist 
Appropriation of Foucault," in Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of 
Being and Knowing, ed. A. Jaggar and Susan Bordo (London: Rutgers University 
Press, 1989), 15.  
17 Ibid. 
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ethical social exchange.”18 Diprose is particularly interested in how pregnant bodies 
and an ethics of reproduction therefore sit uncomfortably in relation to disciplinary 
moral codes.19 In her 2010 chapter The Political Technology of RU486: Time for the 
Body and Democracy, Diprose analyses the Australian RU486 debate with a focus on 
the significance of biotechnologies such as RU486 in challenging political authority 
that is legitimated through an appeal to nature.20 Whereas Diprose is concerned with 
the significance of biotechnologies for democracy, I focus on providing a discursive 
analysis of the ways in which women were spoken about and represented through the 
debate. Diprose’s claims around the role of biotechnologies such as RU486 in 
challenging Cartesian dualism and the idea of women’s reproduction as “obligatory, 
or at least applauded as morally worthy,” 21 are particularly relevant to my analysis. 
The expectation that certain bodies commit time towards the reproduction of the 
nation she sees as an inequity that can be partially redressed by biotechnologies that 
challenge conceptions of what is ‘natural,’ and bodies control over their own 
reproduction.22  
 
In order to question the ethical framework at play in such discussions, Moira Gatens 
believes that there needs to be more theoretical focus on the relationship between 
women’s bodies and the state.23 In Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and 
Corporeality, Gatens determines to utilise the theories of philosopher Benedict 
Spinoza in order to produce an ethical framework that does not define women’s 
bodies by an essentialist understanding of sexual difference but rather by what they 
might become in various socio-technical relations. Gatens creatively uses the term 
“imaginary body” to disrupt traditional binaries and refer to “those images, symbols, 
metaphors and representations which help construct various forms of subjectivity” 
and in particular is concerned with “those ready-made images and symbols through 
                                                
18 Rosalyn Diprose, The bodies of women: ethics, embodiment and sexual difference 
(London, Routledge, 1994), 18.  
19 Ibid., 21. 
20 Rosalyn Diprose. "The Political Technology of RU486: Time for the Body and 
Democracy." In Political Matter: Technnoscience, Democracy, and Public Life, 
edited by Bruce Braun, Isabelle Stengers. (Minneapolis University of Minnesota 
Press, 2010), 222. 
21 Ibid., 222. 
22 Ibid., 213-214. 
23 Ibid., 49. 
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which we make sense of social bodies and which determine, in part, their value, their 
status and what will be deemed their appropriate treatment.”24 Gatens, along with 
Grosz and Diprose, shares the concern that current ethical frameworks deal with a 
default masculine body, arguing that: 
 
The neutral body assumed by the liberal state is implicitly a masculine body. 
Our legal and political arrangements have man as the model, the centre-piece, 
with the occasional surrounding insets concerning abortion, rape, maternity 
allowance, and so on. None of these insets, however, take female embodiment 
seriously. It is still the exception, the deviation, confined literally to the 
margins of man’s representations.25 
 
Gatens’ theory can be applied to the construction of women’s embodiment as well as 
their capacity for decision making and rational autonomy in the discourse around 
abortion in Australia, and in particular the debates over RU486. Throughout the 
parliamentary speeches advocating for the maintenance of ministerial responsibility 
for the approval of RU486, women’s embodied experiences were not discussed, and 
on a number of occasions were actively dismissed. A powerful example of this can be 
found in a speech made by Senator George Brandis expressing that he felt the debate 
had been framed as a women’s issue, and that there had been suggestion that: 
 
Because this issue directly affects women, it is an issue on which the point of 
view of women carries greater weight than the point of view of men. But 
women are sharply divided on this issue, just as men are. There is no ‘female’ 
point of view about abortion.26  
 
Brandis went on to state that the matter is one of when life begins, and therefore 
whether abortion can be “morally defensible” or not, “and that is not a women’s issue. 
                                                
24 Moira Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Coporeality (New York: 
Routledge, 1996),viiii. 
25 Ibid., 24. 
26 Therapeutic Goods Amendment (Repeal of Ministerial Responsibility for Approval 
of RU486) Bill 2005 Second Reading Canberra:  Retrieved from 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22cha
mber%2Fhansards%2F2006-02-08%2F0147%22. 
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It has nothing to do with gender. It is a philosophical issue for women and men 
alike.”27 These sentiments restate the issue as a philosophical one within a 
philosophical framework that does not account for women’s experience and that 
elides its masculine bias. The argument also reframes the debate as one about when 
life begins, and pushes the embodied experience of the pregnant woman to the 
margins.  
 
As soon as a woman falls pregnant her body is no longer viewed as hers but is the site 
for intense moral concern and scrutiny from society and various institutions. 
Tellingly, in the RU486 debate there was a repeated argument that access to RU486 
should not be decided on by the panel of medical experts at the Therapeutic Goods 
Association because they did not view pregnancy as an illness or injury, and therefore 
the drug was not therapeutic. Senator Santo Santoro put forward this argument, 
stating: “I cannot regard pregnancy as a disease. As both a father and a Christian, I 
regard pregnancy as a blessing, a gift, an opportunity and a life.”28 Gatens believes 
that it is common that the “fetus, in utero, represents the ‘completion’ of the female 
body, rather than an ‘addition to it” and proposes this because: 
 
The female body, in our culture, is seen and no doubt often ‘lived’ as an 
envelope, vessel or receptacle…Put bluntly, women’s bodies are not seen to 
have integrity, they are socially constructed as partial and lacking…The root 
of integrity (Latin ‘integritas’) involves not only the notion of wholeness but 
also notions of moral soundness, honour and honesty…I maintain that this 
etymological link is not incidental. Women are not thought to be ‘morally 
sound’ or possess ‘honour’ – that is, to have integrity – precisely because they 
are not thought of as whole beings.29 
 
If, accordingly, we understand women’s bodies to be “’begging the question’ of 
completion by a man and/or child”30 then it is consistent that such dominant cultural 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality, 41. 
30 Ibid., xii. 
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sexual imaginaries would influence the understanding of the decision to terminate a 
pregnancy as somehow unnatural or immoral. 
The intensity with which maternal bodies are regulated cannot be explained by any 
single factor. Diprose quotes Gatens when she writes: “the labour of pregnancy has 
also been privatised but remains, paradoxically, open to public scrutiny in the 
interests of the health and welfare of the social body.”31 The discourses and 
technologies around abortion cannot be understood solely as a concern for the mother 
or concern for the foetus, nor can they be considered solely as an oppressive 
mechanism. Rather, it is important to analyse such discourses with an awareness of 
how disciplinary power operates, and with what consequences. The moral concern 
that is omnipresent in discourses around pregnancy intensifies in cases of abortion, 
discourses that are informed by notions of women as irresponsible and irrational and 
thus in need of regulation or supervision, by an investment in the reproduction of the 
social body, and, by dominant and normative assumptions about women’s place as 
mothers and carers. Therefore it is possible, and necessary, to analyse the multiple 
technologies, practices and disciplinary techniques surrounding pregnancy and 
motherhood in order to better understand the implications and consequences of these 
assumptions.  
 
In 2004 the then Health Minister Tony Abbott, who had used his ministerial 
discretion to veto access to RU486, delivered a speech entitled "The ethical 
responsibilities of a Christian politician." Abbott’s now infamous speech stated that 
the rate of abortion was a “national tragedy” and declared:   
 
The problem with the contemporary Australian practice of abortion is that an 
objectively grave matter has been reduced to a question of the mother’s 
convenience…abortion is the easy way out.32  
 
The impetus for Abbott’s proposal to achieve “fewer abortions, fewer traumatised 
young women and fewer dysfunctional families”33 was to discourage teenage 
                                                
31 Moira Gatens quoted in Diprose, The Bodies of Women: Ethics, Embodiment and 
Sexual Difference, 19. 
32 Abbott, The ethical responsibilities of a Christian politician. 
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promiscuity.  The way in which Abbott framed the problem is interesting and 
corresponds with much of the discourse around RU486. He did not directly condemn 
women who have had abortions, instead assuring his audience he did not wish to 
“stigmatise the millions of Australians who have had abortions or encouraged others 
to do so.”34 However, he went on to question the moral integrity of those women, 
suggesting that they did not “understand that their actions have consequences and take 
their responsibilities seriously.”35 The notion that access to abortion, and in particular 
RU486, would open the floodgates and increase abortion rates is contradicted by the 
statistical data which demonstrates that the factor that decreases abortion rates is 
access to contraceptives, and restricting access to abortion services does not decrease 
abortion rates but instead results in unsafe abortions.36 This suggests that the abortion 
debate is also fundamentally a debate over female sexuality, whereby women who 
have sex for pleasure rather than procreation are construed as immoral and not willing 
to take responsibility.37 
 
The response to Abbott’s speech, and similar comments made by Members of 
Parliament debating the Bill, from pro-choice38 voices was frequently to assert the 
immense difficulty of the decision to have an abortion, and focus on extreme cases 
such as where the pregnancy had resulted from rape. These responses could be 
viewed as existing within the same limited framework set out by those who insist on 
questioning the morality of abortion and position the mother’s rights as being in 
conflict with foetal rights. This perpetuates the stigma surrounding abortion and the 
tendency to view abortions on a ‘case-by-case’ basis as to the degree of morality 
exercised. Corporeal feminist theory has potential for further analysing the 
                                                                                                                                      
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Sneha Barot. "Unsafe Abortion: The Missing Link in Global Efforts to Improve 
Maternal Health." Guttmachar Policy Review, 14.2 (2011). 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/14/2/gpr140224.html.  
37 The abortion debates are heavily informed by a desire to control women’s 
sexuality, however, due to the limited scope of thesis this aspect of the debate will 
only be briefly addressed.  
38 In this thesis I will use the terms ‘pro-choice’ and ‘anti-choice’ to refer to advocates 
for and against abortion access respectively. I have deliberately not used the term 
‘pro-life’ as it is a loaded term that contributes to abortion stigma. I will, however, 
critically analyse the limitations of the choice framework in my third chapter.  
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relationship between women’s embodied experience and the State in these 
circumstances, and for imagining alternative ethical frameworks.  
The way in which women who have abortions are represented and discussed in 
politico-legal forums such as Parliament is significant to women’s understanding of 
themselves and their decisions. During the debate on RU486 Senator Andrew Bartlett 
expressed concern over the impact his colleagues rhetoric may have on women: “To 
label as murderers people who choose to have an abortion or who assist someone to 
do that and to label RU486 as a human pesticide or a drug designed to kill babies is an 
abuse of language and a vilification of women.”39 Even in circumstances where the 
women who have had abortions were not being referred to in clearly negative terms 
the way in which they were described may have an impact on their understanding of 
themselves. It is useful here to draw on Judith Butler who employs Althusser’s theory 
of interpellation; “the hailing of a person into her or his social and ideological 
position by an authority figure.”40 For Butler, interpellation is a “performative 
act…statements that, in the uttering, also perform a certain action and exercise a 
binding power,”41 causing a subject to recognise themselves as they are addressed. 
Butler shares corporeal feminists concern with the way in which women have been 
relegated to the realm of the natural42 and argues that:  
 
It is not enough to inquire into how women might become more fully 
represented in language and politics. Feminist critique ought also to 
understand how the category of “women,” the subject of feminism, is 
produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which 
emancipation is sought.43 
 
The power of interpellation, which I will address in more detail in my third chapter, 
was demonstrated during Parliamentary debates and the media discussion of pregnant 
women who may wish to access RU486 when the women were referred as ‘mothers.’ 
                                                
39 Therapeutic Goods Amendment (Repeal of Ministerial Responsibility for Approval 
of RU486) Bill 2005 Second Reading. 
40 Judith Butler, quoted in Sara Salih, Judith Butler (London: Routledge, 2002), 78. 
41 Judith Butler, Bodies that matter: on the discursive limits of sex, (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 225. 
42 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990), 12.  
43 Ibid., 2.  
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This linguistic distinction is rhetorically significant as it calls women in these 
positions to recognise themselves as mothers, a term that is laden with a focus on the 
potential life of the foetus and suggests that the woman should identify with being a 
mother. The idea of women being ‘naturally’ maternal is destabilised when we 
understand this appellation to be a process of hailing, of constructedness, when, to 
quote Butler, “the apparently naturalised body turns out to be a naturalised effect of 
discourse.”44  As well as having an impact on the way in which women understand 
themselves and how they make and feel about their decisions, the stigma surrounding 
abortion further perpetuates silence around the issue and can sit uncomfortably with 
issues of state responsibility to educate, fund and make accessible services.  
 
Deborah Gould in On Affect and Protest distinguishes between affect and emotion, 
explaining “Where affect is unfixed, unstructured, and nonlinguistic, an emotion is 
one’s personal expression of what one is feeling in a given moment, and expression 
that is structured by social convention, by culture.”45 Just as Butler understands that 
interpellation is historically revisable because there is an “impossibility of full 
recognition, that is, of ever fully inhabiting the name by which one’s social identity is 
inaugurated and mobilized,”46 Gould proposes that every “capture” of affect into 
emotion: 
  
Coincides with an escape of affect as well. Due to that escape, indeterminacy, 
and thus potential, accompany the processes through which something takes 
determinate form within culture. There is always something more than what is 
actualised in social life.47  
 
Gould is particularly interested in the “interpretive emotion work” of social 
movements. As the interpretation of affect into emotion is not fixed, social 
movements can influence the interpretation of affect, providing “an emotional 
                                                
44 Judith Butler quoted in Salih, Judith Butler, 8. 
45 Deborah Gould, On Affect and Protest. In Political Emotions, eds. J. Staiger, A. 
Cvetkovick and A. Reynolds (New York: Routledge, 2010), 27. 
46 Judith Butler, Bodies that matter: on the discursive limits of sex (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 225.  
47 Ibid. 
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pedagogy of sorts, a guide for how to feel and what to do in light of those feelings,”48 
she uses the example of the feminist movement placing women’s feelings of 
depression into their historical context and transforming those feelings into anger.49 It 
is interesting to apply this idea to how pro-choice and anti-choice movements create 
“emotional pedagogies” for how women feel about abortion. I will explore this in 
greater detail in the following chapters in relation to the focus on abortion as a 
difficult and traumatic decision and the implication that women who do not 
experience a moral crisis following an abortion are by nature spurious subjects.  I will 
suggest that those in the debate that use the argument that women should not have 
access to abortion because they need to be protected from post-abortion depression 
fail to account for the dominant social conventions that instruct how affect may be 
interpreted into emotion,50 as they position guilt and regret as an inevitable emotional 
consequence of the procedure. 
 
The discourse around RU486 is particularly interesting when applying Gatens’ theory 
of the ‘imaginary body,’ as it draws attention to how representations of women who 
have had or who consider having an abortion impact on women’s construction of their 
own subjectivity as well as the determining of “in part, their value, their status and 
what will be deemed their appropriate treatment.”51 In this thesis I will seek to explore 
how dualistic and highly normative gendered understandings of women inform the 
discourse around abortion in Australia and deny women bodily integrity. In Chapter 
Two I will provide a historical overview of abortion debates in Australia through to 
the present legal situation in the States and Territories. In doing so I will demonstrate 
that the discourse surrounding abortion has in many ways remained remarkably 
stagnant, with the pro-choice and anti-choice movements both trapped in rhetoric 
focussed on the morality of women’s individual choices. In Chapter Three I will 
engage with the theory I have introduced in Chapter One in order to provide a close 
analysis of how these sexual imaginaries inform both sides of the debate around 
                                                
48 Ibid., 34. 
49 Ibid. 
50 I will return to the question of affect in my third chapter. I am aware that there is a 
whole field of theory in relation to affect, which despite its importance I will only be 
able to touch on here.  
51 Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality, viii.  
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RU486. Finally, I will look to Gatens’ proposal of an alternative embodied ethical 
framework to imagine an approach to the abortion debates that is able to account for 
women’s embodied experience in its total affective context.  
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Chapter Two: Criminal bodies    
 
When a state makes abortion legal or illegal, it determines whether women live or 
die, with dignity or fear. 
Dr Jo Wainer, 200652 
 
This thesis will focus primarily on the controversy surrounding the introduction of the 
medical abortion pill RU486 to Australia and the specific ways in which the 
discourses around RU486 have represented women. In this chapter I will examine the 
debates in the Senate, House of Representatives, the media and the broader 
community. However, it is first necessary to explore the historical background of the 
RU486 debate and understand the current legislative and legal framework of abortion 
in Australia. As abortion is legislated at the level of States and Territories each 
jurisdiction has its own complex and fraught history and this chapter will not seek to 
give a complete account of this, rather, I will provide a preliminary background of the 
major events and decisions that have shaped the current status of abortion in 
Australia.  
 
Abortion remains technically illegal in most of Australia, with the procedure existing 
in murky legal territory. This situation is incongruous with the reality of access to 
abortion as it is one of the most common and safest medical procedures in Australia 
and it is estimated that one in three Australian woman will have an abortion in her 
lifetime.53 Although it is possible to access abortion in most areas, there are a number 
of factors that impact on its accessibility. The legal ambiguity surrounding abortion 
has meant that it has primarily been confined to private clinics, rather than public 
hospitals, and generally located in large centres.54 Furthermore, the prohibitive costs 
associated with the procedure itself and the travel costs for women from rural and 
                                                
52 Jo Wainer, Lost: illegal abortion stories. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
2006), 3. 
53 Tanya Drabsch, Abortion and the law in New South Wales: Briefing Paper No 9/05  
(Sydney: NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2005), 3. 
54 The Regulation of Abortion in Australia: Public Health Perspectives (ACT: Public 
Health Association of Australia, 1998), 4.  
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regional areas who may not have a local option mean that socio-economic and 
geographical factors are significant.  
 
Where abortion continues to be listed in the Crimes Act or Criminal Code the 
enforcement of those laws has been guided by subsequent legal rulings. In some cases 
this has resulted in greater clarity within the law, and in other cases it has further 
obfuscated it. The rulings in significant cases in Australia have predominantly 
determined under what circumstances a doctor can legally perform an abortion. These 
rulings have often set out under what circumstances a doctor can determine it 
justifiable to refer a woman for an abortion, a decision that commonly rests on 
whether the doctor is satisfied that the continuation of the pregnancy would result in 
serious threat to the woman’s physical or mental wellbeing. 
 
The Criminalisation of Abortion 
 
The inclusion of abortion in Australian Crimes Acts and Criminal Codes has its 
historical basis in the common law of the United Kingdom. Initially abortion early in 
the pregnancy was not considered an offence, and only became so once the fetus had 
‘quickened’ (moved), this distinction was later abolished in 1837, making any attempt 
to procure a miscarriage a felony.55 Significantly, in 1861 the law was expanded to 
criminalize the pregnant woman, whereas previously it had only been concerned with 
the person who performed the abortion. The movement towards criminalizing the 
pregnant woman mirrored the concern of the Catholic Church with the perceived 
immorality of abortion.  
 
It was not until 1929 that termination was determined to be permissible where 
necessary to save a woman’s life.56 Significantly, this determination was the result of 
a case where a fourteen-year-old girl was raped and the doctor deemed that her mental 
and psychical health would be endangered if she were forced to continue the 
pregnancy. While this opened the way for abortions to be performed, it also has meant 
that women have had to present themselves as psychologically struggling in order to 
                                                
55 Drabsch, Abortion and the law in New South Wales: Briefing Paper No 9/05, 13.  
56 Ibid., 15.  
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seek an abortion, and that the question of ‘justification’ for the procedure has had a 
significant presence in discourse around abortion. Both sides of the debate often 
reinforce this dynamic, with anti-choice groups talking about women who have 
abortions for ‘selfish’ reasons such as pursuing their career, and pro-choice 
campaigns often relying on the emotive example of ‘would you force this woman to 
have her rapist’s baby.’ In such debates women who have abortions are 
predominantly portrayed as young, promiscuous and unwilling to take on the 
responsibility of motherhood. This stigmatized representation is in stark contrast to 
the reality of the broad range of women who access abortion. Historically married 
mothers who could not afford to have more children have largely accessed the 
procedure, and been forced to have illegal abortions or travel interstate because they 
have not been judged to be able to ‘justify’ their abortion.57  
 
Australia’s laws were largely based on the UK 1861 Abortion Act that criminalized 
any woman who attempted to procure a miscarriage, and allowed scope for abortion 
in cases of mental or psychological threat to the woman. The same wording that 
existed in the UK in 1861 remains unchanged in the NSW Crimes Act and the QLD 
Criminal Code.58  
 
The early history of abortion in Australia was overwhelmingly that of illegal and 
often unsafe ‘backyard’ abortions, or of dangerous attempts by women to end their 
own pregnancy.59 Herbal and chemical treatments were popular and were often 
ineffective and poisonous, other women who could not afford abortions operated on 
themselves with household objects including coat hangers and knitting needles.60 The 
relationship of the feminist movement to abortion and contraceptives has changed 
radically over time. Post-suffrage feminists considered that contraception was a 
symptom of unbridled sexuality, and they considered sex to be necessarily degrading 
for women and therefore concentrated on measures that would restrain sexuality, such 
                                                
57 Anne Summers, Damned Whores and God's Police (Victoria: Penguin Books 
Australia, 1975), 366.  
58 Ibid., 14. 
59 The Regulation of Abortion in Australia: Public Health Perspectives, 3. 
60 Your Body Your Baby: Women's Legal Rights from Conception to Birth. (Sydney: 
Redfern Legal Centre Publishing, 1996), 25. 
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as increasing the age of consent.61 It was only in the 1960s, with the advent of 
feminism that embraced the notion of sexual freedom that the feminist movement 
began to make demands for safe, legal and affordable contraception and abortion.62 
Much of the campaigning effort and the legal reforms around abortion have been 
motivated in response to awareness of cases where women have died as a result of 
illegal abortions. In The Regulation of Abortion in Australia: Public Health 
Perspectives, the Public Health Association estimates that if the same number of 
women were to die now from abortion-related causes as did in 1960, maternal 
mortality rates would be tripled.63 
 
Status of Abortion in Australian States and Territories 
 
In this section I will trace changing moments in the legislative history of abortion as a 
means of demonstrating the extent to which the conception of abortion remains 
anchored in the 19th century. It is disturbing that our current language and frameworks 
for viewing abortion remain situated in a period of time when women were not 
recognized as legal subjects and were denied voting rights.  
 
The status of abortion varies throughout Australia as it is legislated for at the level of 
States and Territories. The Territories are the only jurisdictions to not have had 
abortion included in their criminal legislation. The Northern Territory deals with 
abortion under its Medical Services Act and allows abortion up to 14 weeks gestation 
if there is risk to the woman’s physical or mental health, or if the child is at 
substantial risk of disability. The Australian Capital Territory does not include 
abortion within its Crimes Act and is the only part of Australia where the ultimate 
decision making power rests with the woman at every stage of the pregnancy.64 
                                                
61 Marilyn Lake, "The Invioable Woman: Feminist Conceptions of Citizenship in 
Australia." In Feminism the Public & the Private, ed. J.B. Landes (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 232-234. 
62 Anne Summers, The Misogyny Factor (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2013), 25. 
63 The Regulation of Abortion in Australia: Public Health Perspectives, 2. 
64 Paul Gerber and Melissa Castan. "A Woman's Right to Choose: Human Rights and 
Abortion Rights in Australia." In Contemporary Perspectices in Human Rights Law in 
Australia, edited by P. Gerber and Melissa Castan (Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 2013), 
270. 
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The States have all historically included abortion in their Criminal Code or Crimes 
Act, and there have been a range of legal and political efforts since 1969 to the 
present day to reform or repeal these sections. These efforts, along with a number of 
significant legal decisions, have either restricted or liberalised abortion access and 
have defined the circumstances under which abortion may be legal, where the 
decision-making authority rests and the timeframe in which abortions can occur. 
These measures all result from and perpetuate particular beliefs surrounding women’s 
autonomy, their facility for decision-making and their role in society. 
 
South Australia was the first State to define the circumstances under which an 
abortion may not be a crime. The South Australian Criminal Code was amended in 
1969 to allow abortion for up to 28 weeks gestation for reasons of maternal health, or 
if there is a substantial risk that the child will be mentally or physically disabled.65 
Tasmania passed the Reproductive Health (Access To Terminations) Bill 2013 that 
amended the Criminal Code to determine that abortion would only be considered a 
crime if carried out by someone other than a medical professional or the pregnant 
woman, or without the woman’s consent. The Bill went further to institute a ban on 
protesting within 150 meters from premises at which terminations are provided; 
Tasmania is the only jurisdiction in Australia to have this restriction on protesters.66  
  
Victoria experienced a significant shift in the status of abortion during the 1970s 
following the public revelations of dangerous practices of backyard abortions and the 
police corruption that had sustained this situation. The work of Doctor Bertram 
Wainer during this period was dramatized in the 2012 ABC television drama A 
Dangerous Remedy. Wainer’s interest in abortion was spurred by 1969 death of 21 
year old Carolyn Jamieson who was found dead following an illegal abortion she was 
too ashamed to tell her parents about.67 This incident spurred Wainer give up his 
General Practice and to throw himself into the cause of abortion law reform and 
                                                
65 Australian abortion law and practice. (2013, 10 December 2013). 
http://www.childrenbychoice.org.au/info-a-resources/facts-and-figures/australian-
abortion-law-and-practice (accessed 10 March 2014, 2014). 
66 Tasmanian Legislative Council. Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Bill 
2013, (Government Printer Tasmania, 2013).  
67 Melissa Sweet. "Lost: Illegal Abortion Stories." British Medical Journal 333 
(2006): 307.  
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would ultimately lead to the Menhennitt ruling in Victoria that determined abortion to 
be lawful where necessary to “preserve the woman from a serious danger to her life or 
her physical or mental health.”68 Following the Menhennitt ruling Wainer and his 
partner set up Australia’s first openly operating abortion clinic.69 
 
Jo Wainer, Bertram Wainer’s partner and an abortion rights activist instrumental in 
the campaign to decriminalise abortion in Victoria in the 1960s wrote Lost: Illegal 
Abortion Stories, telling the stories of women who had illegal abortions between 1930 
and 1980. Wainer chose the title Lost to reflect her view that there was poor public 
policy surrounding abortion because women’s voices had not been included. Wainer 
evokes the impact of the criminalization of abortion and the unquestioned and 
inherent paternalism enshrined in the legislation, writing:  
 
The illegal and dangerous nature of abortion at the time served the purpose of 
keeping women terrified and powerless in relation to their bodies and their 
lives, and dependent on, and in service to, their husbands.70 
 
Crucially, the Menhennitt ruling allowed scope for doctors to determine that an 
abortion was necessary and put an end to the days of abortion being steeped in police 
corruption and dangerous backyard operations. However, the procedure remained in 
the Criminal Code until the successful 2008 Abortion Law Reform Bill which 
decriminalized abortion up until 24 weeks gestation. The Bill’s passing was decried 
by anti-choice organizations, with Pro-Life Victoria stating: “you have just 
condemned untold numbers of Victorians to death…their blood is on your hands.”71 
Others, including Jo Wainer, welcomed the move as putting an end to the uncertainty 
                                                
68 Gideon Gaigh. "The Principle of Necessity: Justice Menhennitt & Australia's Roe v 
Wade." The Monthly. 
http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2007/november/1316494184/gideon-
haigh/principle-necessity. 
69 Sweet, Lost: Illegal Abortion Stories, 307. 
70 Wainer, Lost: illegal abortion stories, 3. 
71 "Abortion decriminalised in Victoria. The Sydney Morning Herald. 
http://news.smh.com.au/national/abortion-decriminalised-in-victoria-20081010-
4xz2.html  
 21	  
	  
around abortion services and allowing women greater control over their lives and 
reproductive choices. 
 
In Western Australia in 1998 two doctors were charged under the Criminal Code for 
performing an abortion. Up until this point Western Australia had been in a similar 
situation to many other States in that abortion was included in the Criminal Code but 
the law remained unenforced and services were generally available. The charges 
caused most doctors to immediately cease providing abortions for fear of the legal 
consequences. This created a degree of urgency as the case was not likely to be heard 
for eighteen months and in the meantime Western Australian women were left 
without access to abortion. Those who could afford to do so traveled interstate, 
however, many could not afford this option and two women were admitted to hospital 
after attempting to self-abort.72 
 
In response to the charges Labor Member of Parliament Cheryl Davenport pushed 
through a bill to amend the Criminal Code and was successful in reforming the law. 
However, the outcome was compromised, as restrictions were placed upon access to 
abortion with women under sixteen requiring parental consent and abortion only legal 
up until twenty weeks gestation.”73  
 
Many of the significant moments in abortion law reform and legal rulings have been 
in response to a situation where a rarely exercised law has been utilized, with 
immediate and severe consequences for access to abortion in that State. I recently 
spoke with a member of the New South Wales Upper House who has been heavily 
involved in the pro-choice movement and explained that pro-choice New South Wales 
politicians were wary of pushing for abortion law appeal for fear of results like those 
in Western Australia and Victoria where abortion law reform has in some ways 
further restricted access through requiring parental permission and restricting access 
to late term abortions. Such a circumstance has arisen as a direct result of the 
disproportionate influence of the anti-choice movement in Parliament, through such 
                                                
72 Cheryl Davenport. "Against the odds: abortion law reform in Western Australia," in 
Party Girls: Labor women now, ed. Penny Sharpe and Jo Tilly (Sydney: Pluto Press, 
2000) p.87. 
73 Ibid., 93. 
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voices as Fred Nile in the New South Wales Upper House, as well as widespread 
cultural discomfort with the notion of late-term abortion.  
 
In New South Wales abortion is still listed in the NSW Crimes Act 1900, which 
allows sentencing of up to 10 years for the pregnant woman or anyone aiding the 
procurement of a miscarriage by drug or other instrument, or life imprisonment for 
anyone who supplies the “drug or noxious thing” knowing it is to be used for a 
miscarriage.74 The current application of the law is guided by the 1971 ruling by 
Justice Levine which determined that abortion would be legal if the doctor found 
there was “any economic, social or medical ground or reason" that an abortion was 
required to avoid a "serious danger to the pregnant woman's life or to her physical or 
mental health"75 at any point during the pregnancy. The applied impact of this ruling 
is that any woman who is faced with an unplanned pregnancy and wishes to have an 
abortion must be prepared to mount an argument as to why she is deserving of an 
abortion, having to demonstrate physical or psychological frailty in order to qualify. 
The implication of this process is that choosing an abortion can never be a responsible 
or moral choice, and that the woman must be in some way incapable if they do not 
wish to continue the pregnancy.  
 
The consequences of listing abortion in the Criminal Code have been exemplified by 
a recent criminal case in Queensland in 2009. The case is demonstrative of the archaic 
nature of the 110 year old Criminal Code, and how the combined force of legal, media 
and public attention has reinforced the stigma of abortion and the limited 
understanding or framing of what could be a ‘justifiable’ abortion.  
 
The criminal case was brought against Cairns resident Tegan Leach who was charged 
for procuring her own miscarriage and her partner Sergi Brennan who was charged 
for assisting her as he had supplied her with mifepristone, or RU486. The arrest 
occurred as a result of the police searching their house in relation to another matter 
and finding the mifepristone packaging. Leach had readily and freely explained to 
                                                
74 Australian abortion law and practice. (2013, 10 December 2013).   Retrieved 10 
March 2014, 2014, from http://www.childrenbychoice.org.au/info-a-resources/facts-
and-figures/australian-abortion-law-and-practice. 
75 Costa, RU486: The Abortion Pill, 79.  
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them that the pills had been used to terminate her pregnancy, as she was not aware 
that abortion was illegal under the Criminal Code.76   
 
The bringing of the charges alone caused an immediate reduction in abortion services 
in Queensland. In Cairns the only two doctors providing abortions ceased to operate 
for fear of legal repercussions, and many more across the state followed, including 
those operating in public hospitals. Pro-choice lobby groups were disappointed that 
the case did not serve as a trigger to reform the 110 year old Criminal Code to remove 
abortion.77 
 
During the trial the Crown prosecutor argued that the Leach’s abortion was a 
“lifestyle choice” and therefore illegal as it was not for the protection of her life or 
health. Leach and Brennan were finally acquitted eighteen months after the arrest and 
following a harrowing media spectacle in which their names and photographs were 
continually displayed. Many of the abortion providers who ceased to operate during 
this time have since recommenced, however, the case did cause an overall reduction 
in abortion providers and greater confusion over the application of the law.78 The 
Cairns case powerfully reflects the notion that women who have abortions in all but 
the most extreme circumstances are manifestly irresponsible, selfish and immoral, and 
that their behavior must be closely regulated.  
 
Present threats  
 
At the time of writing there are a number of measures being considered by State and 
Territory Parliaments that threaten to place new restrictive measures on abortion 
access and criminalise pregnant women for their actions during pregnancy.  
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Interestingly, the measures being considering in New South Wales, South Australia 
and Western Australia do not specifically address abortion, rather, they propose 
affording personhood status to the foetus. These measures allow for a substantial shift 
in the way women’s bodies are regulated, as they risk criminalizing women for what 
they choose to do with their body during pregnancy.  
 
In New South Wales a Bill, known as Zoe’s Law, has recently passed through the 
Lower House. The Bill was put forward as a direct response to the experience of 
Brodie Donegan, who miscarried following a car accident and felt that there should be 
a greater sentencing than grievous bodily harm for the driver. Member of the 
Legislative Council Fred Nile who publicly opposes abortion introduced the original 
Bill. The Bill provides for a perpetrator to be charged with manslaughter in such a 
situation as it gives personhood status to the foetus. In South Australia the Offences 
Against the Unborn Child Bill and in Western Australia a Foetal Homocide Bill have 
both been narrowly defeated by one vote in recent years and may be reintroduced to 
Parliament.79 While on face value the laws do not address abortion, many legal and 
medical groups as well as pro-choice lobbyists and activists have expressed concern 
that giving a foetus personhood is a significant conceptual departure from previous 
laws and would further confuse the law surrounding abortion and place women and 
medical professionals at risk of prosecution.80  
 
The Northern Territory Government is considering whether to introduce legislation to 
“either prosecute or alternatively restrain [women] from engaging in conduct that 
harms their unborn child.”81 Tellingly, the Northern Territory Attorney General John 
Elfernick, who is pushing for the legislation in the interests of protecting foetal rights, 
has said that though these measures “brings into question a number of human 
                                                
79 Rachel Watts. "Foetal homicide laws set up a competing set of rights for women." 
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rights…we will cross that bridge when we get there.”82 Elfernick’s statement suggests 
a perceived division between women’s rights and foetal rights, and a societal need to 
be regulating women’s bodies in order to protect the rights of the unborn.  
 
There is currently a proposal in Victoria from Member of Parliament Geoff Shaw who 
is preparing a Private Members Bill that includes measures including not requiring 
anti-choice doctors to refer patients to an impartial colleague, requiring pain relief to 
be provided to foetuses during the termination procedure and to resuscitate foetuses 
that survive the procedure.83 Shaw has stated these measures are in response to the 
problem of sex-selective abortions and instances where foetuses survive the 
termination procedure, in spite of there being no evidence of either of these 
circumstances occurring in contemporary Australia. Shaw has positioned himself as 
both a protector of the unborn and champion of women’s rights: 
 
Here in Australia we can’t kill snake eggs but we are quite happy to kill an egg in 
the tummy and it should be the safest place for a baby to be. How can any women 
who are pro-women’s rights say that you can kill girls?84 
 
Shaw’s rhetoric is particularly extreme in its disregard for biological accuracy and its 
portrayal of women as incubators. However, it is also broadly reflective of a number 
of consistent themes in anti-choice arguments, including: the appeal to the morality of 
the nation in conjunction with a call to protect foetuses, here presented as children, 
and the protection of women, whose irrational logic would lead them to damage their 
own sex if it were not for masculine intervention in their reproductive decisions.   
 
These recent moves to criminalise women for what they choose to do with their 
bodies during pregnancy perpetuates the dominant cultural sexual imaginary of 
women as reproductive vessels and thus public property, and, as morally irresponsible 
or deficient and lacking in bodily integrity or restraint and composure. Within this 
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framework the woman’s body is no longer her own but a site of intense societal and 
institutional scrutiny, and in this case the site of explicit (Foucauldian) discipline,85 
operating in the interest of the continuing health and reproduction of the nation.   
 
Abortion experiences  
 
In her autobiography Ducks on the Pond Anne Summers writes candidly about her 
experience of an illegal abortion; she chooses to share her story with the public as a 
reminder of the vital importance of safe and accessible abortion services. Summers’ 
account is singular as women rarely spoke about their experiences of abortion and 
information on how to obtain one was very difficult to find. The secrecy and shame 
that abortion is shrouded in is reinforced and promoted by the legal status and framing 
of abortion. Due to the prohibitive cost and lack of abortion providers prior to 1970, 
many women died from attempting to terminate the pregnancy themselves through 
use of pills, potions or sharp instruments.  
 
Summers’ doctor refused to assist her in procuring an abortion, as he did not want to 
be involved in illegal activity. She recounts resorting to “all the so-called old wives’ 
remedies. I had sat in a scalding hot bath and tried to force down a bottle of gin. I had 
been on energetic walks. I had jumped off tables.”86 These attempts were 
unsuccessful and Summers tried to make an appointment in Melbourne, the first place 
she tried charged 120 pounds so she booked with another operator who charged $60 
pounds. She tells of travelling to Melbourne by train without her parent’s knowledge 
and being picked up from a street corner and blindfolded before being driven to a 
secret location where she was put under anesthetic. The experience was horrifying, 
Summers describes the plastic bucket on the floor between her legs and hearing the 
doctors discuss what she would look like in a bikini as they operated on her.  
 
Once she returned to university in Adelaide, Summers spent the first two weeks 
hemorrhaging and experiencing cramping pains. Eventually she sought help from the 
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doctor who had refused her an abortion and he advised her she had had an incomplete 
abortion and arranged for her to be admitted to a public hospital as a teaching patient 
so that she would not have to pay for the operation and so it would take place when 
the hospital was empty. Summers reflects poignantly on the “cruel absurdity” of a law 
that did not prevent abortions but forced women either into dangerous backyard 
abortions or to resort to performing their own, a choice which often claimed their 
lives.87  
 
As a result of seeking to assert her freedom of choice and her autonomy and control 
over her own body Summers was forced to endure not only the criminalization of her 
behaviour, but also humiliation, isolation, physical harm and sexual objectification. 
Her story demonstrates the prohibitive power of the threat of legal sanction on 
doctors’ willingness to treat patients, the impact of financial and geographical 
restrictions upon access to abortion and the powerful symbolic and material impacts 
of the stigma and shame surrounding abortion. 
 
While the accessibility and safety of abortion has increased since Summers’ 
experience, the stigma remains. In 2008 young journalist Clementine Ford published 
one of her first opinion pieces in which she spoke about having had two abortions. 
The piece is titled “Clementine Ford reveals her two no guilt, no shame abortions” 
and in it Ford addresses the societal pressure that she felt to feel shame and grief over 
the decision. Ford discusses her awareness that her abortions would be frowned upon 
by many and not deemed to be justifiable as she has had multiple abortions and did 
not agonize over the decision: 
 
I feel no shame regarding either of them. I acted in my own best interest, a fact 
I refuse to apologise for. It wasn’t the ‘hardest decision I have ever had to 
make’. It was actually really, really easy. The only thing I felt afterwards was 
intense relief. Women have got to stop feeling like they owe the world a 
truckload of guilt simply because they exercised their legal right to govern 
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their own reproduction.88  
 
Ford’s radical account of her experience attracted many negative responses. 
Reflecting on the experience in 2013, Ford writes; “But had I written that I’d been 
raped twice (I wasn’t, but that’s beside the point), perhaps I would have secured more 
sympathy from the readers. As it was, they saw a young woman writing with no 
apology about the fact that she’d chosen to prioritise her life and ambitions over that 
of a potential life. I was reimagined as a ‘slut’ who ‘couldn’t keep her legs closed’ 
and used abortion ‘as a contraception.’”89 Ford’s experience illustrates the pervasive 
and corrosive impact of abortion stigma and the moral dichotomy set up between 
abortions that are seen as ‘justifiable’ and abortions that are viewed as irresponsible or 
selfish. The ferocity of the responses to Ford demonstrates how women’s experience 
of abortion is regulated and policed on a societal and cultural level and women are 
disciplined for not conforming to expectations that they manifest feelings of regret 
and grief.   
 
The Abortion Debates 
 
The argument that restricting abortion access protects the foetus and the woman is a 
relatively recent one. In analyzing what is at stake in the regulation of abortion it is 
crucial to understand the historical development of the debate and how it has been 
informed by patriarchal ideology of the role of women as mothers and wives entrusted 
with the service of the reproduction of the nation, with the biological reproduction of 
the body politic.90 Furthermore, it is interesting to consider how these ideas live on in 
present discourse and to what extent they are representative of community attitudes 
towards abortion.   
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The anxieties surrounding access to abortion are paralleled in the history of 
contraceptives in Australia. The notion that abortion is immoral has a strong 
grounding in the teachings of the Catholic Church, however, this was due to concern 
with the use of contraceptives and abortion due to a belief that sex that was not within 
the sanctity of marriage and thus for procreative purpose was immoral. As sex 
explicitly for pleasure was frowned upon and abortion was seen as evidence of this, 
abortion was considered doubly reprehensible. It was only towards the end of the 19th 
century that the Catholic Church began to focus on an ontological view of the foetus 
as a life in need of protection.91  
 
In Australia the abortion debates were also entangled in anxieties over the 
reproduction of the white nation. The Church and the State viewed contraception and 
abortion as being responsible for the declining birthrate and were especially 
concerned by the increasing use of these methods by white women, believing it was 
"race suicide."92 Indeed, concern for population control also informed early family 
planning advocates, who were motivated by eugenicist ideology rather than concern 
for women’s control over their bodies.93  
 
The extent to which concerns about contraception and abortion were based on 
racialised ideas, rather than concern for foetal life, is evident when considering the 
experience of Indigenous Australian women. During the 1970s the Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs was supplying Depo Provera as a contraceptive through 
Indigenous medical services, despite knowledge that it was ineffective and caused 
spontaneous termination of pregnancy.94 Thus, paradoxically, at the same time as 
white feminists were campaigning for abortion access, Indigenous women were 
suffering under a policy of forced and nonconsensual abortions.  
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The impact of these eugenical and pronatal ideas saw white women portrayed in the 
1904 Royal Commission on the Decline of the Birthrate as “abdicating their civic 
responsibility by selfishly choosing to limit their families.”95 In Populate and Perish: 
Australian Women’s Fight for Birth Control, Siedlecky and Wyndham identify that it 
was only from the late 1960s that the debate shifted to concern for protection of the 
foetus from the moment of conception.96 
 
These histories belie the idea that the abortion debate has always been one concerned 
with the protection of the foetus. Furthermore, they clearly demonstrate the ways in 
which public and institutional anxieties around abortion and contraception have been 
entrenched in controlling women’s sexuality and role in society and the perpetuation 
of a particular liberal and patriarchal vision of the nation. While these traditional 
notions of the nation, marriage and women’s role in society have shifted, they are still 
evident in the abortion debates and public discourse and policy as well as the 
institution of government financial incentives to marriage and motherhood.  The post 
World War II slogan “Populate or Perish” was used to increase the birth rate, and in 
2004 the then Federal Treasurer Peter Costello told Australian women: “You should 
have one for the father, one for the mother and one for the country…come on, your 
nation needs you.”97 This statement echoes a call to war and implicitly suggests that 
women are putting the nation in peril by having abortions.  
 
There is not a substantial amount of data on Australian perspectives regarding 
abortion, however, there have been a number of studies done in recent years that have 
sought to gauge public opinion on this subject. Numerous opinion polls have 
demonstrated widespread support for the idea that women should be able to decide 
whether to access abortion, and very little support for further restrictions on 
availability.98 In 2005 the Bioethics Institute published their study Give Women 
Choice: Australia Speaks on Abortion. The study was a survey of one thousand two 
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hundred adults across Australia and it found that seven out of ten respondents agreed 
that Australian women should have legal access to abortion. However, the 
respondents did display discomfort in relation to the question of the morality of 
abortion: “apart from the ‘hard cases’ involving a danger to the mothers health or 
foetal disability, fewer than one in four thinks that abortion is morally justified.”99 In 
this respect, the criteria for legal abortion requiring that the doctor be satisfied of a 
threat to maternal or foetal health, does reflect a widely held belief that, in Naomi 
Wolf’s words, “some abortions are less moral than others.”100   
 
In the government sponsored report We Women Decide: Women’s Experiences of 
Seeking Abortion in QLD, SA and Tasmania, the authors found that women’s 
experiences of abortion were radically divorced from the ways in which the issue was 
handled in public debate. The women interviewed predominantly did not refer to the 
foetus as life and the authors found: 
 
There was widespread resentment among women that their reasons for seeking 
abortion needed to be judged worthy by doctors in seeking a ‘counselling’ 
exchange…. women resented the fact that they were required to present 
themselves as or be designated as mentally incompetent.101 
 
The disjuncture between the respondents experiences of the process of seeking an 
abortion and their considerations in making that choice and the concerns emphasized 
in public debate suggests a need for a greater presence of women’s voices in the 
debate. Furthermore, the women’s resentment reflects their discomfort with the 
paternalistic nature of the process required to obtain an abortion. The presumption 
that women should fulfil their maternal role and reproduce for the nation positions 
them as vessels that must be regulated effectively in the interests of society.  
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In conclusion, the history of abortion in Australia is one that maps regulation of 
reproduction as a site for intense social and political scrutiny. The very act of bringing 
these stories into focus is significant, as women’s voices and experiences have been 
excluded from dominant histories. Furthermore, these women’s histories highlight the 
historically contingent nature of embodied experience and the central role of 
reproductive autonomy in determining the overall conditions and possibilities of 
women’s lives. In the following chapter I will apply the theories introduced in 
Chapter One to an analysis of the debate over the medical abortion pill RU486 and I 
will then explore the feminist potential of an embodied ethical framework.  
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Chapter Three: A moral crisis for the nation  
 
RU486 divides Australia like no pill since The Pill. 
Sydney Morning Herald, 2006.102 
 
In my third and final chapter of this thesis I have chosen to focus on the RU486 
debate in Australia as it frames and highlights many of the central concerns with 
women’s role in society and their status and capacity to be rational and autonomous 
citizens. Firstly, I will outline the key events in the RU486 debate and engage the 
theories of corporeal feminism introduced in Chapter One to explore the recurring 
themes in the discourse around the use of RU486, in particular I will consider the role 
of sexual imaginaries in the core themes of the debate and their implications for 
women’s experience and status in society. Further, I will critically analyse the 
responses from pro-choice proponents within the debate and consider how responses 
that foreground the question of women’s decision-making and the liberal feminist 
‘choice’ framework fall within the same dualistic framework as the anti-choice 
movement and thus are ultimately limited in effect. Finally, I will argue for the 
importance of an alternate embodied ethical framework.  
 
The drug RU486, or mifepristone, works to suppress progesterone and cause the 
lining of the uterus to break down, thereby terminating the pregnancy. ⁠103 RU486 has 
been used by many countries around the world since the late 1980s and is listed by the 
World Health Organisation as an essential medicine. ⁠104  
 
The issue of allowing RU486 to be supplied in Australia has been politically 
determined in accordance with partisan concerns. It was the staunchly anti-choice 
Independent Senator Brian Harradine who tabled the Therapeutic Goods Amendment 
Bill 1996 that created a new class of goods, “restricted goods” defined as “drugs 
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intended for use in women as abortifaceints.”105 The Bill specified that restricted 
goods could not be imported without the permission of the Minister for Health. This 
ideologically driven legislative move was unprecedented as the usual process for the 
importation of drugs involved the Therapeutic Goods Administration’s panel of 
medical experts making an assessment on the safety of the drug, thereby allowing 
doctors to prescribe and patients to use the drug. ⁠106 Harradine’s interest in restricting 
abortion access came from his own belief that abortion is immoral and that his 
concern that RU486 would increase abortion rates as he believed: “RU486 is 
promoted as a simple do-it-yourself, private, demedicalised abortion.”107 Harradine’s 
concern over RU486 being administered in the home suggests anxiety that the process 
could take place in the ungoverned private sphere of the home, a sphere that is 
simultaneously feminised and connected to the body and thus to irrationality, thus 
seen as requiring masculine surveillance, intervention and control. Harradine was able 
to exert influence far beyond proportional representation, as at the time he was one of 
two Independent Senators holding the balance of power for passing the Howard 
Governments legislation in the Senate. ⁠108 The restriction on women’s access to 
medical abortion in Australia was facilitated in return for Harradine’s vote in favour 
of the privatisation of Telstra.   
 
The issue came to prominence during the period of October 2005 to April 2006, due 
to media attention and an increase in the lobbying efforts of many women’s groups 
and health activists. ⁠109 The representative make-up of Parliament had changed 
significantly since the Harradine Amendment had been voted on, with a seventeen 
percent increase in female representation. ⁠110 On the 8th December 2005 a cross-party 
Private Members Bill, the Therapeutic Goods Amendment Bill 2005, was moved by 
Senators Fiona Nash (National Party), Lyn Allison (Democrats), Claire Moore 
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(Labor) and Judith Troeth (Liberal). ⁠111 This was the first time that a Private Members 
Bill had been moved by representatives from four different parties and it signalled the 
beginning of what would become an unprecedented effort between majority women 
representatives moving across party lines to ensure the removal of Ministerial 
responsibility for the approval of RU486. Their efforts were ultimately successful 
when the Bill was passed in February 2006 following a conscience vote. Ninety 
percent of women Senators voted in favour of the Bill, in stark contrast with only 
forty-six percent of male Senators. ⁠112 These figures are a powerful indication of the 
difference in approach to issues of women’s reproductive decisions by women 
representatives compared to their male counterparts. It also suggests that increased 
female representation in politics would substantially shift the way issues of women’s 
bodily integrity are discussed and legislated for by Government. If we consider 
Pateman’s argument that liberal representative democracy is based on a fraternal and 
sexual pact that legitimates men’s access to women’s bodies,113 the presence of 
women in political institutions has the potential to partially disrupt the force and 
stability of that pact.  
 
The consideration of legislation of reproductive issues as a matter for the individual 
morality of representatives, rather than a representation of the views of their 
electorate, is formalised through the use of a conscience vote.  The vote on the 
Therapeutic Goods Amendment Bill 2005 was positioned as a moral question from 
the outset as it was determined it would be a conscience vote, representatives were not 
bound to vote with the rest of their party but could vote according to personal 
conviction as the issue related to matters of life or death. Sawer and Simms have 
argued that the historical insistence on conscience votes on matters of women’s 
reproductive and domestic concerns is a gendered phenomenon that reflects the 
patriarchal divide between public and private, and the tendency to see such issues as 
not “warranting the label of real politics,” instead being considered a private and 
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moral concern.114 Many representatives who wanted Ministerial approval to be 
maintained argued that it was incumbent on the Government to take responsibility for 
such moral decisions and that medical professionals could not be trusted to make 
moral decisions. For example, Senator Gary Humphries argued that the TGA were 
“not equipped to make the ethical, social and political decisions which would 
surround the use of RU486 in Australia”115 and Senator Helen Polley argued that the 
drug should not be dealt with by the TGA: “Why are we considering allowing the 
TGA to make a decision about a drug that kills? … Is RU486 for therapeutic use? It is 
clear that it is not…Pregnancy is not a disease, nor is it an injury.”116 These arguments 
portrayed abortion as radically separate from all other medical procedures because it 
involves termination of a foetus.  
 
In February 2006 a Sydney Morning Herald headline read: “RU486 divides Australia 
like no pill since The Pill.”117 The equation between the debate over the contraceptive 
pill and the medical abortion pill is telling, as it suggests anxiety over technology that 
has the potential to alter women’s ability to have autonomy over their sexuality and 
reproduction without external surveillance from the public sector. Diprose argues that 
the controversy over RU486 was due to the potential for biotechnologies to transform 
meanings to do with sex, the body and reproduction and believes the efforts to retain 
ministerial responsibility were “an attempt to minimize the possibility that women 
could ‘do it themselves’ away from direct scrutiny of biopolitical regulative 
mechanisms.”118 While these factors provoke concern for those invested in 
maintenance of the patriarchy, the successful mobilization of a group made up of 
predominantly women in vocal and persuasive support of access to these pills 
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demonstrates a desire to transform such meanings and insist upon greater bodily 
autonomy.  
 
Pregnancy is not an illness119 
 
The insistence that women must always desire pregnancy is a striking example of 
women’s bodies being framed as a vessel, “begging the question of completion by a 
man and/or child.”120 Furthermore, statements such Senator Barnett’s that “pregnancy 
is not an illness” and Senator Santoro’s comment that pregnancy is always a 
“blessing”121 are good examples of Butler’s theory of interpellative performative 
statements, where performativity is a “reiterative and citational practice by which 
discourse produces the effects that it names.”122 The Senators are regulating the 
performance of gender norms in drawing on a repetitive and historical reiteration that 
women should experience pregnancy with gratitude and acceptance. Butler draws 
upon Foucault when she describes the status of the maternal body as “An effect or 
consequence of a system of sexuality in which the female body is required to assume 
maternity as the essence of itself and the law of its desire.”123 This assumption that 
reproduction is at the very (irreducible) centre of a woman’s identity is apparent in the 
statements of these Senators and whilst interpellative performative statements can 
only ever achieve partial success, Butler argues, “Subjects who do not willingly 
embrace the names they are called will nonetheless be constituted by them.”124 
Therefore, the Senators statements prescribe the way women should experience and 
respond to pregnancy, whether unwanted or not, by refusing to entertain the idea that 
pregnancy could be experienced as anything other than a cause for celebration and 
gratitude. Thus, women who do not experience their pregnancy in this way are 
nevertheless policed and constituted by abortion stigma that relies on a reiterative and 
disciplinary insistence on what is ‘normal’ for a woman to experience or feel when 
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faced with pregnancy.  
 
The increased accessibility of the drug was of primary concern to both supporters and 
opponents of the Bill. Many of the criticisms of RU486 were fearful that abortion 
would be made easier, with Henshaw observing that critics saw RU486 as meaning 
“easier access to safe abortion services, an easier treatment for medical and nursing 
staff to administer, or easier - both physically and psychologically for the women 
having abortions.”⁠9 The arguments put forward in relation to easier access were 
frequently inconsistent; oscillating between concerns that women would find the 
process too easy and not grasp the moral consequences of their actions, and the idea 
that RU486 would place women at greater risk of harm and trauma.  
 
A laissez-faire approach to termination125 
 
The submission to the Senate surrounding RU486 from the Catholic Women’s League 
of Tasmania stated: “The apparent simplicity when compared to a surgical abortion is 
likely to result in those close to the women regarding it as a relatively trivial event” 
and Senator Santoro referred to pro-choice Senators as having a “laissez-faire126 
approach to termination.”127 These statements convey a belief that if women have 
increased control over the administration of the process, and it is done in a private 
setting without state intervention or regulation, this will mean that they will make 
immoral decisions without an understanding of the implications of their actions. The 
rhetoric of ‘trivial’, ‘convenient’ abortions returns the debate to one of women being 
irrational actors incapable of rational and moral decisions. Furthermore, it perpetuates 
the concept of a dichotomy between the woman and the foetus, with the foetus 
requiring protection from the dangerous and immoral woman.  
In his 2004 speech, "The Ethical Responsibilities of a Christian Politician," Tony 
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Abbott expressed his concern that “an objectively grave matter has been reduced to a 
question of the mother’s convenience.”128 This comment, alongside accusations of 
abortions on “whim or caprice”129 and the legal requirements in the majority of 
Australia, begs the question of what reasons would be sufficient for a woman to be 
considered ‘deserving’ of an abortion. Feminist legal theorist Drucilla Cornell has 
argued that: “If a woman’s personhood is truly to be represented by the law, then she 
must also be the ultimate source of the decision to abort and the meaning given to that 
decision.”130 The comments made by a number of representatives in Parliament and 
the Senate, and the criminalisation of abortion in many jurisdictions, denies women 
the opportunity to give their own meaning to their decision by requiring that they 
demonstrate their physical or mental incapacity for motherhood in order to access an 
abortion. Moreover, the interpellation of women who fail to ‘perform’ their normative 
gender (by refusing to embrace their pregnancy) as selfish or trivial imposes a 
disciplinary moral framework on women that contains implicit messages about what a 
woman is and her subjectivity, how she should experience her life and her body.  
 
The meaning making of Ford’s account, described in the previous chapter, of her 
abortion experiences demonstrates a resistance to this moral code. Ford made a direct 
link between the criticisms she received for “prioritising my life and ambitions over 
that of a potential life” and being “reimagined as a ‘slut.’”131 Ford resisted providing 
an account of herself that would appease dominant understandings of what is a ‘less 
immoral’ abortion by being open and unapologetic about the reasons for her decision. 
Ford’s resistance displays the necessary incompleteness of interpellation as she resists 
being hailed as a ‘slut’, however, in responding she also demonstrates the power of 
that name as even in the refusal of it she is nonetheless defined in relation to it. 
 
In contrast, when social commentator Jane Caro said on radio that she had had an 
abortion, she was surprised by the lack of vitriol she received and the number of 
women who then spoke to her about their own abortions. Caro was motivated to speak 
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publically for the first time about her abortion when in a radio interview two men 
were discussing the topic “as if it happened to a small and peculiar group of not-very 
nice females.”132 Caro’s later written account of her abortion was similar to Ford’s in 
its refusal to comply with a moral code that demands guilt and shame, writing: 
 
For the few weeks that the pregnancy lasted I always felt it had happened to 
my body and not to me. When I had the termination, I felt not just relief but 
that my life had gone back to being the way it should be.133 
 
This account reflects the disconnect between dominant conceptions of abortion and 
women’s embodied experience of the practice and what it may mean for their lives. 
The response following the interview caused Caro to reflect on the needlessness of 
what she termed “the great female silence.”134 She concluded that “if unwanted 
pregnancy and abortion are such a normal part of women’s lives I often watch those 
who fulminate against the practice and wonder how many women in their lives are 
lying to them.”135 This reflection illustrates the role of stigma in contributing to the 
exclusion of women’s voices and allowing disproportionate representation of male, 
anti-choice voices.  
 
A national tragedy136  
 
The nationalistic concerns that have historically informed abortion debates were also 
evident in the discussions of RU486, when in 2006 Federal Member of Parliament 
Dana Vale stated in reference to the RU486 debate that Australia could become a 
Muslim nation within fifty years because “we are aborting ourselves almost out of 
                                                
132 Jane Caro. "The truth is abortions are normal." The Hoopla. 
http://www.womensagenda.com.au/talking-about/opinions/jane-caro-the-truth-is-
abortions-are-normal/201311143205#.U4RzXFiSwSg. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Abbott, The Ethical Responsibilities of a Christian Politician. 
 41	  
	  
existence.”137 Vale’s comments demonstrate the continued presence of nationalist and 
xenophobic anxieties regarding abortion rates. In the coverage of Vale’s comments a 
number of her colleagues expressed their own concern with the rate of abortions. 
 
The 2007 implementation of a National Pregnancy Support Helpline is illustrative of 
a coervice strategy to limit women’s control over their reproductive choices and 
sexual agency. In his memoir, Battlelines, Abbott explains that he introduced the 
Helpline because, “It seemed like the best way to nudge the abortion rate down 
without affecting a woman’s right to choose.”138 The Helpline was run by a Catholic 
organization and funded by the Federal Government, and did not provide referrals to 
abortion services.139   
 
Such prevailing anxieties over the rate of abortion, an issue that was described 
emotionally by Abbott as “a national tragedy”140 demonstrate that the ideologies 
informing resistance to abortion availability are multiple. Rather than being limited to 
concern for the foetus these debates are also tied to not only patriarchal constructs but 
to racial and nationalist ideology and the idea that the burden of reproduction falls to 
the (white, heterosexual) Australian woman. 
 
No-one benefits from abortion; all are hurt141 
 
The anti-choice arguments during the RU486 debate alternated between condemning 
women who have abortions and expressing concern for their wellbeing. Many of the 
arguments from representatives and groups opposed to RU486 were centred around 
concern for the woman who they believed would be isolated and ill-informed, not 
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understanding the consequences of her actions and needing greater intervention from 
the state, doctors and other groups. For example, Alison Hope from the Australian 
Federation of Right to Life Associations, stated: 
 
It [RU486] can further isolate women who are already desperate and 
unsupported, leaving them to undergo the abortion process and possibly face 
the sight of their 4-7 week old aborted child alone…our society is capable of 
providing women who are pregnant in difficult circumstances with better, 
more supportive solutions than drugs such as RU486.⁠142 
 
Similar concerns were put forward by Senator Steve Fielding who said of his party: 
“Family First is pro woman, which is why we must also consider the potentially 
serious medical and psychological effects [of RU486 use].”143 In his speech to the 
Senate opposing the bill, Senator Barnaby Joyce described: “the RU486 process, with 
the culmination of little hands and legs, glazed eyes and a skull being flushed by the 
mother down a toilet, is especially psychologically and physically brutal.”144 Joyce’s 
confronting and graphic speech interpellates women facing unwanted pregnancy as 
mothers cruelly destroying a life, and in the process harming themselves. This 
interpellation combined with a doubled concern for protecting the foetus from the 
woman and protecting the woman from herself, is a powerful example of the ways in 
which women are understood as irrational, dangerous, animalistic and chaotic vessels 
in need of paternalistic guidance in all matters of reproduction.  
 
In considering the consequences of arguments that oppose access to abortion on the 
basis that abortion is traumatic and will inevitably result in guilt, depression and 
trauma, I believe it is necessary to distinguish emotion from affect. Gould describes 
affect as being the “noncognitive, nonconscious, nonlinguistic, and nonrational 
qualities of emotion.”145 In contrast, emotion is that which “squeezes a vague bodily 
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intensity or sensation into the realm of cultural meanings and normativity.”146 This 
understanding of the differentiation of emotion and affect allows for awareness of the 
operation of sexual imaginaries in informing an emotional pedagogy in relation to 
abortion.  Insisting upon this distinction destabilizes the assumption in such 
arguments that responses such as guilt and shame are ‘natural’ emotional responses, 
and instead betrays the disciplinary role that these arguments themselves play in both 
prescribing and proscribing certain affects.  
 
Others believed the concern expressed by RU486 opponents for women’s health was 
insincere. For example, Senator John Faulkner argued that: 
 
Concern over risks and side effects is an alibi for the real reason: the 
determination to keep this option closed to Australian women. This simple 
question of process - that experts, not politicians, should decide if a drug is 
safe and appropriate for import - has become a proxy for a campaign against 
Australian women’s right to control their fertility and choose for themselves 
whether to continue or end a pregnancy.147  
 
The intense regulation of how women make decisions in relation to their reproduction 
reflects broader imaginaries of what women’s role in society should be. While 
opposition to RU486 was often framed as being in the interests of the woman, those 
representatives and groups only focused their attention on the woman’s wellbeing 
while she was pregnant, in other words, they were only interested in her welfare to the 
extent that it ensured successful reproduction. It is significant that such concerns did 
not extend to the woman’s wellbeing following the birth, whether such consideration 
be for the woman’s own personal circumstances or for institutional and social 
supports such as childcare and paid parental leave. This debate suggests that the 
intense regulation of the female body as a maternal body that is concerned with the 
reproduction of citizens and of the public body, and thus invokes the patriarchal 
liberal Enlightenment understanding of woman as by their very nature incapable of 
reason and morality and requiring intervention and control in the interests of the 
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(reproduction of the) state.  
 
Strikingly, there were a number of occasions during the debate where women 
expressed frustration at the way their gender had been positioned and portrayed in the 
debate and how they had been instructed and governed to feel about pregnancy. 
Senator Lyn Allison gave a powerful speech in which she shared her own experience 
of abortion and expressed frustration at many of her male colleagues comments: 
 
This is why it is so galling listening to the men - and it is mostly men - who 
have neither compassion nor understanding of the huge, and for many, 
daunting task of taking an embryo the size of a grain of rice to 
adulthood…Women are fully human. We will act on our own set of values 
and can be trusted to make reproductive health decisions with those we 
trust…An estimated one in three women has an abortion - and I am one of 
them.148 
 
Senator Allison’s speech was a powerful insistence upon women’s agency and 
autonomy, and also for the first time a recognition of the enormous physical and 
material demands that pregnancy makes upon a woman, an aspect which the state is 
not nearly as interested in being involved in or supporting.   This assertion of 
women’s agency was also evident in Dr Jo Wainer’s submission to the Senate: 
“Women are fully human and capable of fully moral decisions. They do not require 
the oversight or the supervision of Parliament (or anyone else) to ensure that they 
make ethically sound decisions about mothering.”149 There were numerous comments 
from women politicians, lobbyists and commentators during the debate that insisted 
on women’s status as equally human and not a feminine subset of a humanity whose 
default human figure is masculine. These comments convey frustration with an 
inequitable and highly restrictive framework that denies women’s ability to make 
ethical decisions and awareness that women are not being afforded bodily integrity, 
autonomy and rational sovereignty.  
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An intensely personal and difficult decision150  
 
The sexual imaginary of women as essentially maternal vessels in need of patriarchal 
intervention in their decisions concerning reproduction was pervasive in the RU486 
debates. In response, many pro-choice voices emphasized the difficulty of the 
decision to terminate a pregnancy with comments such as Senator Penny Wong’s 
statement that to terminate a pregnancy is: “An intensely personal and difficult 
decision.”151 This response insists on women’s decision-making capability, however, 
it also contains implicit messages about how women should feel about such a 
decision.  
 
The need to emphasize the difficulty of the decision to terminate a pregnancy is 
argued for by bioethicist Cannold in her book The Abortion Myth: Feminism, 
Morality and the Hard Choices Women Make. Cannold believes that the pro-choice 
movement sidelines women’s voices and has failed to reclaim the terms of the debate 
away from a framing that positions foetuses as lives in need of protection from 
women,152 she shares Naomi Wolfe’s view that the pro-choice movement has lost 
support because of its refusal to see abortion as a moral issue.153 Cannold proposes an 
alternative approach that places the pregnant woman and her decision making process 
at the centre of concern in the interests of demonstrating that: “sometimes abortion is 
not the most moral choice, it is the only one.”154 Cannold professes to having set out 
to “reclaim the moral ground”155 in the abortion debate and she interviewed forty-five 
Australia women from a range of backgrounds. Her findings included: 
 
For these women the central moral issue was whether or not a woman’s decision 
to abort was - or was not - justified. What differentiated a choice to “kill from 
care” and an immoral abortion choice was the pregnant woman’s motives, 
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behaviour, emotions and decision-making process. Did she have good reasons? 
Did she consider everyone’s needs and interests? Did she make her decision 
thoughtfully and lovingly? Grieve over the need to make the decision at all?156 
 
Cannold’s approach succeeds in asserting that women are capable of making 
decisions around their reproduction, however, it simultaneously prescribes a moral 
decision making framework that places care for the potential life of the foetus at the 
centre and sets up a sliding scale of abortion morality.157  
 
It is necessary to consider the interpretative and symbolic work implicit in Cannold’s 
identification of the affect that accompanies ‘good reasons,’ such as grief. In 
attempting to demonstrate the morality of some ‘difficult’ abortion decisions, this 
framework is illustrative of Gould’s argument that social movements can create 
‘emotional pedagogies,’158 as it delegitimises and stigmatises decisions that do not 
demonstrate these emotions and thus it does not prioritise the woman. Cannold’s 
argument is representative of how the pro-choice movement often perpetuates similar 
regulative power to the anti-choice movement in calling women to fulfil an ideal of 
the woman who makes selfless decisions in the interests of the foetus and, wherever 
she is able, carries a pregnancy to term. While the aims of the movements are 
separate, they both send explicit and implicit messages about what makes a ‘good’ or 
a ‘bad’ abortion and how women should feel, thus regulating and prescribing affect as 
well as action.   
 
The central failing of Cannold’s approach is that it accepts dominant conceptions of 
morality without considering how these moral codes are produced. Fittingly, Gatens 
argues that morals or ethics have “historically been the product of which ever group 
has monopolized political right,”159 and argues for an alternative embodied ethics, a 
subject I will return to later in this chapter. Therefore it is essential that morality is not 
considered as universal and transcendent, rather, that it is seen as gendered, partial, 
cultural and contextual and thus subject to scrutiny for its instrumental role in 
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patriarchal social relations and control.  
 
Let us leave it to the woman160  
 
The dominant framework of the pro-choice movement has been a liberal feminist 
approach that focuses on abortion as a choice that should be in the hands of the 
woman. This approach has been very successful in enabling a focus on bodily 
autonomy and placing the woman and her decision at the centre of concern, rather 
than the foetus or the interests of the nation. However, Traina is critical of the choice 
model, writing in her book Feminist Ethics and Natural Law: “liberal feminism 
erroneously assumes that creation of external conditions for moral autonomy is 
sufficient to undo women’s oppression.”161 The choice framework risks presupposing 
that if the legal barriers are removed, the woman will have the economic, social, 
geographical and educational means to access an abortion. It also fails to account for 
the relational element of autonomy, whereby the possibility of autonomy is supported 
or undermined by socio-cultural relations162 and also those Foucault refers to as 
disciplinary and that Butler describes by way of interpellation. Butler considers 
arguments for abortion access should aim to: 
 
Understand how the “viability” of a woman’s life depends upon an exercise of 
bodily autonomy and on social conditions that enable that autonomy…we are 
referring to forms of autonomy that require social (and legal) support and 
protection, and that exercise a transformation of the norms that govern how 
agency itself is differentially allocated among genders, thus a woman’s right to 
choose, remains, in some contexts, a misnomer.163  
 
The ‘choice’ to have an abortion or not is one aspect of the ability of a woman to 
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control her reproduction and therefore her future. Diprose employs a Foucauldian 
understanding of power in looking at how “power operates to construct a possible 
field of actions”164 in any situation where an individual may have an apparent 
freedom to choose. Where the choice model has been successful is in insisting that the 
final choice must rest with the woman because it is her body, however, it also risks 
being a privatised model that keeps abortion a hidden, shameful event and does not 
demand state support or funding to ensure real choice for all women.  
 
Women are fully human and capable of making moral decisions165  
 
The RU486 debate is an exemplar of the failure to reconceptualise abortion in the 
context of contemporary society and the ways in which the discourse on this topic is 
dominated and tempered by ideas that we consider to have been long overturned and 
revolutionised by the equality arguments of second wave feminism. The responses 
from pro-choice advocates demonstrate the risks inherent in defending the morality of 
women’s decision making, as well as the limitations of the choice model in ensuring 
actual choice for women. 
 
Crucuially, the RU486 debate also demonstrates the discursive power of women's 
voices speaking on abortion. When Gillard stated, "We don't want to live in an 
Australia where abortion once again becomes the political plaything of men who 
think they know better," she received overwhelming criticism for daring to speak on 
the issue as a woman. The criticism that Gillard recieved whenever she spoke on 
issues relating to women, that she was playing the "gender card," is argued by Anna 
Goldsworthy, in her 2013 Quarterly Essay Unfinished Business: Sex, Freedom and 
Misogyny, as functioning as a "useful silencing term, through which female grievance 
can be reduced to phatic noice."166 The backlash to Gillard's comments illustrates 
Gatens' argument that, "Women speaking in public, of women, is clearly a threat to 
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the integrity of the political body."167 The RU486 debate, which saw women from all 
sides of politics successfully unite to insist upon greater reproductive autonomy, is a 
powerful example of the disruptive and transformative power exercised by the 
inclusion of women's voices in the discourse surrounding women's bodies.  
 
In her submission to the RU486 Senate Inquiry, Dr Jo Wainer wrote, “women are 
fully human and capable of making moral decisions.”168 It is a powerful reflection of 
the historically stagnant nature of this debate that a woman who has have been active 
in campaigning for and providing access to abortion since the 1960s is compelled to 
inform the Senate of a seemingly basic truth.  
 
In researching this topic I have been struck by the continued relevance of theorists 
such as Pateman who wrote that modern civil society was a patriarchal social order 
based on a division between “men’s reason and women’s bodies.”169 Furthermore, 
given recent and current threats to women’s reproductive autonomy, the assertion by 
second wave feminists that free, legal and accessible abortion is central to women’s 
liberation remains pertinent. These notions are not recent ones and thus their bearing 
on current events suggests a need for a critical approach to the ways in which abortion 
access has been advocated for and what alternative frameworks are available for 
understanding this issue. The pervasive dominant sexual imaginaries that frame 
women as irrational, maternal vessels serve to restrict the ways in which issues 
around women’s bodily integrity can be discussed and thought of. Gatens writes:  
 
Our political vocabulary is so limited that it is not possible, within its parameters, 
to raise the kind of questions that would allow the articulation of bodily difference 
and it would not tolerate an embodied speech.170  
 
The RU486 debate reflects a political vocabulary that was informed by ideas of 
women as vessels, compelled to reproduce for the good of society and the nation. The 
                                                
167 Gatens, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality, 136. 
168 De Costa, RU486: The Abortion Pill, 109.  
169 Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory, 
45.  
170 Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality, 26. 
 50	  
	  
pro-choice voices in the debate were therefore forced into a basic defence of women 
as responsible, moral decision makers who could be trusted to put the interests of the 
potential life of their foetus first. In order to progress beyond this bind, there must be 
an abandonment of Cartesian dualism that legitimates women’s subordination, and an 
end to the reliance on disciplinary moral codes to police women’s reproductive 
decisions.   
 
In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir wrote, “Humanity is male, and man defines 
woman not in herself, but in relation to himself; she is not considered as an 
autonomous being.”171 In this statement Beauvoir identifies that the default social 
body is masculine and therefore women are always only defined in relational terms to 
men and do not have autonomy. Beauvoir’s response was to accept the dualisms that 
framed women’s bodies as impediment and immanence and to propose that women 
must be made equals so as to strive for disembodied transcendence from nature. 
Gatens is critical of this approach, so fundamental to equality feminism, because 
women are “able to be ‘disembodied’ in the public sphere because ‘natural’ functions, 
childrearing, sensuality, and so on, have become the special province of women and 
are confined to the private sphere.”172 This failure of equality feminism to account for 
women’s embodied experience is evident in the abortion debates and the inability to 
imagine women as whole beings.  
 
The application of insights from corporeal feminist theory assists in opening up new 
and more nuanced ways of reconceptualising abortion. Gatens argues for the 
transformative potential of recognising our sexual imaginaries, “Bringing these 
[sexual] imaginaries into focus may well contribute to the process of altering both the 
affects of which we are capable and the ways in which we may affect others.”173 
 
The pervasive nature of sexual imaginaries in determining how women and their 
bodies are understood is starkly evident in discussions of abortion. Gatens is useful 
for turning our focus to the operation of these sexual imaginaries because she 
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uniquely combines an approach that avoids any biological determinism or recourse to 
essentialised sexual difference and thereby diffuses the problematic of the difference 
versus equality debate as she is able to address embodied difference while 
understanding gender as “the way in which power takes hold of and constructs bodies 
in particular ways.”174 Therefore Gatens recognises the role of the cultural imaginary 
in how we construct ourselves, and seeks to explore the material impact this has had 
on women’s experience.  
 
An inability to account for matters concerning women’s reproduction in a way that is 
not through the paternalistic imposition of a disciplinary moral code is illustrated in 
the decision to handle decisions regarding abortion by a conscience vote. Grosz is 
concerned with the ways in which: 
 
The corporeal ‘universal’ has in fact functioned as a veiled representation and 
projection of a masculine which takes itself as the unquestioned norm, the ideal 
representative without any idea of the violence this representational positioning 
does to its others.175 
 
So too, Bordo situates unwanted pregnancy within “histories and practices of 
containment and control” that have shaped women’s bodies as “politically inscribed 
entities.”176 In analysing the varied implicit and explicit framing of women that have 
abortions as existing on a sliding scale of morality it becomes clear that the one 
constant of the debate is not concern for the foetus, rather, what is consistently 
identifiable is the reiteration of a particular understanding of women’s ‘natural’ role 
in society, and an exercise of control to maintain that. This has manifested itself in 
diverse ways, including in concern that any woman who does not wish to be pregnant 
is irrational and in need of regulatory intervention and control to ensure that she is not 
a danger to her foetus. Also significant is the continued anxiety over women’s 
sexuality that is betrayed by the tendency for anti-choice arguments to focus on the 
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woman’s sexual activity, rather than the man who impregnated her, and to propose 
abstinence as a solution rather than promote improved sex education or access to 
contraception.   
 
The application of a Foucauldian understanding of power, in relationship to a 
corporeal feminist understanding of the particular operations of patriarchal power 
over women’s bodies in modern society, is crucial to understanding that even in 
circumstances where all formal barriers to access to abortion may be removed, 
women’s understanding of themselves and the options available to them may still be 
restricted by sexual imaginaries. Diprose engages with Foucualt’s understanding of 
“how power operates to construct a possible field of actions” in order to argue that the 
focus of ethics must be widened from attention to the relationship to individuals to the 
“political investments in the knowledges and practices that constitute our embodied 
being in the world.”177 This in turn raises questions of what an alternative ethics 
would look like, and how to centre women’s own experience without opening up their 
decisions to further patriarchal scrutiny.   
 
From paternalistic morality to feminist ethics  
 
It may seem unlikely that the abstruse theories of Spinoza would be of relevance to 
contemporary abortion debates, however, Gatens utilises Spinozist philosophy as she 
believes that it circumvents the dualisms of traditional modern philosophy, while also 
allowing for difference that is not dichotomised. In this way it avoids the pitfalls of 
equality feminism, which accepts traditional philosophical dualisms and therefore 
cannot account for embodied difference; and of difference feminism, which is 
biologically determinist.  
 
Gatens draws on Spinoza to argue that contemporary ethics is based on masculine 
experience, and therefore there needs to be created an ethics of difference “which 
would be capable of acknowledging that different forms of embodiment are 
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themselves historical and open to change.”178 For Spinoza, there is no universal 
morality and no knowable body, rather, the capacities and limitations of bodies are 
determined by their context and are therefore unknowable. 
 
The Spinozist approach is useful for conceiving of an alternative view of abortion as a 
Spinozist reading of a woman in a circumstance of unwanted pregnancy would be of a 
“historically specific body whose capacities are reduced by its sphere of activity and 
the conditions under which it creates itself.”179 An analysis of such a circumstance 
within this framework would therefore not rely on assumptions of woman as 
‘naturally’ or ‘essentially’ maternal and irrational, nor on notions of morality that 
insist that a woman prioritise a potential life over her own. Instead, it would consider 
the body as having integrity and look to how its own capacities for action may be 
maximized or reduced depending on its context. Gatens employs a Spinozist 
philosophy because it relies on an embodied ethics and allows theorization of the 
relationship between “sexed bodies and other body complexes such as the body 
politics or other institutional assemblages.”180 Within this embodied ethical 
framework there is awareness as to all of the ways in which “institutions function to 
deplete women’s powers of action,”181 even after formal barriers to participation in 
society are removed.  
 
In practice, the approach to abortion that most closely reflects a Spinozist philosophy 
may be found in the Reproductive Justice movement. The Reproductive Justice 
Movement is an approach to advocating for women’s reproductive autonomy that 
originated in the United States as a response from women of colour to the pro-choice 
movement that they saw as relying on, white, bourgeois and liberal “essentially 
individualist, consumerist notions of 'free' choice that do not take into consideration 
all the social, economic, and political conditions that frame the so-called choices that 
women are forced to make.”182 The Reproductive Justice movement is instead 
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interested in an intersectional approach that strives for women to have and exercise 
reproductive rights with regards to deciding whether or not to have a child, and the 
“enabling conditions to realize these rights.”183 Furthermore, the approach asserts that, 
“the ability of any woman to determine her own reproductive destiny is linked 
directly to the conditions in her community.”184 Therefore, the focus is not merely on 
the decriminalization of abortion, but also on access to reproductive health services, 
and addressing the structures of oppression that may limit women’s capacities to fulfil 
their own aims and desires.  
 
In its consideration of the “enabling conditions to realize these rights” the 
Reproductive Justice movement reflects Gatens’ understanding of embodiment as the 
“total affective context of the body.”185 In this sense this movement holds the 
potential to achieve a critical awareness as to how women’s bodies are regulated 
through social and institutional controls, and mirrors Spinoza’s focus on how a bodies 
capacities may be depleted or enabled dependent on their context. The Reproductive 
Justice framework further rejects the public/private divide that corrals matters of 
women’s embodiment into the private sphere, and instead insists on the importance of 
these issues in determining women’s capacity for being in society.  
 
The issue of women’s control over their reproduction has always been at the centre of 
feminist efforts to refuse and reform the patriarchal construction of women as slaves 
to their bodies and reproduction, in contrast to men who are considered able to master 
their bodies through reason. By bringing into focus the dualistic sexual imaginaries 
that inform our dominant cultural, socio-political and legal understandings of abortion 
the potential for Gatens’ alternative embodied ethical framework is brought into 
focus. In recognising the importance of moving away from a reliance on 
understandings that are informed by these reductive and ideologically driven dualistic 
sexual imaginaries, and instead embracing an approach that does not demand neat 
resolution Gatens approach accommodates the conflicting and never univocal 
experiences of women by understanding the experience of the body and sexuality 
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(and agency) as always complex, unstable, mutable and contingent.  
 
Abortion debates in Australia have frequently focused on the decision to abort as a 
moral question, thereby applying an intrinsically oppressive and patriarchal moral 
framework that is incapable of affording women bodily integrity. An embodied 
ethical framework has the potential to circumvent this difficulty as it would assume 
women to have bodily integrity and approach any circumstance in regards to how her 
powers and capacities may be impacted by the total affective context of her existence, 
understanding that this is historically contingent and subject to change.  
 
In this thesis I have analysed the situation of abortion in Australia, with particular 
focus on the introduction of RU486, in order to locate and explicate the ways in 
which women’s bodies are regulated and understood and how this may impact on 
their capacities in all areas of life. The theories of corporeal feminists allow women’s 
embodied experience to be addressed without reverting to the terrain of difference 
feminism and biological determinism. The insistence upon a Foucauldian 
understanding of power enables an understanding of the diverse and historically 
changeable ways in which bodies are regulated. Furthermore, Butler’s theory of 
interpellation and Gould’s theory of how social movements create guides for the 
interpretation of emotions are useful in ascertaining how women may be compelled to 
understand themselves and their decisions and how that is also subject to partial 
resistance and historical change. Finally, Gaten’s use of Spinoza in advocating for an 
alternate ethical framework offers an alternative to these disciplinary and discursive 
binds such that women’s embodied experience is placed at the centre of the debate.   
 
A critical ethical approach to abortion, informed by insights from corporeal feminism, 
insists upon women's own non-monolithic but contingent and embodied experience 
and thus returns to women the agency to determine what is in their best interest, rather 
than focusing attention on ‘woman as mother’ who bears the responsibility to 
reproduce in the interests of the patriarchy, morality and the nation. As I have sought 
to demonstrate in this thesis such an approach to the question of abortion, which has 
been governed by outmoded patriarchal representations of women and a highly 
disciplinary discourse, is both necessary and long overdue. 
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